Secure Multicast Communications with Private Jammers by Cumanan, Kanapathippillai et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
9.
05
08
4v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
6 S
ep
 20
16
Secure Multicast Communications with Private
Jammers
Kanapathippillai Cumanan†, Zhiguo Ding‡, Mai Xu⋆, and H. Vincent Poor§
† Department of Electronics, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK.
‡ School of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK.
⋆ Department of Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, China.
§ Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA.
Abstract—This paper investigates secrecy rate optimization for
a multicasting network, in which a transmitter broadcasts the
same information to multiple legitimate users in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable
secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate interfer-
ence to confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers charge
the legitimate transmitter for their jamming services based
on the amount of interference received at the eavesdroppers.
Therefore, this secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated
as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jammers and
the transmitter are the leaders and the follower of the game,
respectively. A fixed interference price scenario is considered
first, in which a closed-form solution is derived for the optimal
amount of interference generated by the jammers to maximize
the revenue of the legitimate transmitter. Based on this solution,
the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, at which both
legitimate transmitter and the private jammers achieve their
maximum revenues, is then derived. Simulation results are also
provided to validate these theoretical derivations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of information theoretic security was first
investigated in [1] for wiretap channels by defining the concept
of the secrecy capacity. Since then, information theoretic
security has received considerable attention due to its low
complexity implementation and suitability for the dynamic
configurations of wireless networks, in which the physical
layer characteristics of wireless channels are exploited to
establish secure communication between legitimate terminals.
This novel paradigm complements the conventional crypto-
graphic methods implemented in the upper networking layers
by providing additional security at the physical layer.
Multi-antenna terminals have the potential to enhance the
performance of secret communications by exploiting spatial
degrees of freedom. However, the secrecy rates which are
achievable by using multi-antenna terminals are still limited
by the quality of the wireless channels between the legitimate
transmitter and the receivers, including the legitimate receivers
and the eavesdroppers [2]–[7]. The existing works in [3], [8],
[9] demonstrate that the performance of secret communica-
tions can be further improved by using cooperative jamming
and artificial noise techniques, in which jamming signals
are transmitted from external jammers or integrated with the
information bearing signals sent by the legitimate transmitter.
These approaches effectively degrade the capability of the
eavesdroppers for retrieving the legitimate users’ signals, and
hence enhance the achievable secrecy rates.
Recently, game theoretic approaches have been applied to
the resource allocation problems in wireless secret commu-
nication networks [10]–[18]. In [10], a zero-sum game was
formulated for a secret communication network by consid-
ering the signal-to-interference-plus-noise rate (SINR) differ-
ence between the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
as the utility function. The interaction among the nodes in
cognitive radio networks has been investigated by using the
Stackelberg game [11]. Cooperative game theory has been
used to improve the secrecy capacity of ad-hoc networks in
[13], and a distributed tree formation game was proposed for
multihop wireless networks in [12]. Physical layer security has
been investigated through a Stackelberg game for a two-way
relaying network with unfriendly jammers in [14], and a dis-
tributed auction based approach has been used to enhance the
secrecy capacity in [15]. Jamming games have been formulated
for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels
with an active eavesdropper in [16], and a secrecy game for
a Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference
channel has been investigated in [17].
In this paper, a multicating network is considered as shown
in Fig. 1, where all the legitimate users are to receive the
same information in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In
order to improve the achievable secrecy rates of the legitimate
users, the private jammers are employed to generate artificial
noise and confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers
introduce the costs for their jamming services based on the
amount of interference generated to the eavesdroppers. To
compensate these jamming costs, the legitimate users pay the
transmitter for their enhanced secret communications. Based
on these interactions between the legitimate transceivers and
the private jammers, we formulate the secrecy rate maximiza-
tion problem as a Stackelberg game. A fixed interference price
scenario is considered first and then a closed-form solution
for the optimal amount of interference generated to each
eavesdropper is obtained. Based on this solution, we then
investigate the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium for the
formulated game. In addition, simulation results are provided
to validate the theoretical derivations of the proposed game
theoretic approach.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A secret communication network with K legitimate users,
L eavesdroppers and L private jammers is considered in this
paper, as shown in Fig.1, where the transmitter broadcasts a
common message to be received by all the legitimate users
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In this secure
network, the transmitter is equipped with NT transmit an-
tennas, whereas the legitimate users and the eavesdroppers
are equipped with a single receive antenna, respectively. The
channel coefficients between the legitimate transmitter and the
kth legitimate user as well as the lth eavesdropper are denoted
by hk ∈ CNT×1 and gl ∈ CNT×1, respectively.
In addition, a set of private (friendly) jammers are employed
to provide jamming services as shown in Fig.1. These private
jammers generate artificial interference to confuse the eaves-
droppers and they ensure that there is no interference leakage
to the legitimate users. This is achieved by appropriately
designing the beamformers at the jammers and employing
a dedicated jammer near to each eavesdropper. Since, a
dedicated jammer is closely located to the corresponding
eavesdropper, each eavesdropper receives strong co-channel
interference from its corresponding private jammer.
Note that these private jammers charge the legitimate
transceivers for their dedicated jamming services based on
the amount of interference generated to each eavesdropper.
To compensate these interference costs, the legitimate trans-
mitter introduces the charges to the legitimate users for their
enhanced secure communications, by using the achievable
secrecy rates as the criteria. The channel gain between the
lth eavesdropper and the corresponding jammer is denoted by
|gjl|
2
. Furthermore, it is assumed that the legitimate transmit-
ter and the jammers have the perfect channel state information
of the eavesdroppers. This assumption is appropriate in a
multicasting network, where potential eavesdroppers are also
legitimate users of the network. This assumption has been
commonly used in the literature [19]–[21]. The achievable
secrecy rate at the kth user can be written as follows: [22]
Rk=
[
log
(
1+
wHhkh
H
k w
σ2k
)
−max
1≤l≤L
log
(
1+
wHglg
H
l w
σ2e + pk|gjk|2
)]+
,
(1)
where w ∈ CNT×1 and pk are the beamformer at the
legitimate transmitter and the power allocation coefficient for
the kth private jammer, respectively. The σ2k as well as σ2e
denote the noise variances at the kth legitimate user and the
eavesdropper, respectively, and [x]+ represents max{x, 0}.
III. GAME THEORETIC APPROACH FOR SECRECY RATE
OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we formulate the secrecy rate maximization
problem into a Stackelberg game and then investigate the
Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game. This game
consists of two sets of players: a) leader and b) followers. All
these players try to maximize their revenues, where the leaders
first make a move and the followers will choose their strate-
gies according to the leaders’ decisions. In the multicasting
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Fig. 1: A multicasting secure network with K legitimate
users, L eavesdroppers and L private jammers.
network considered in this paper, the private jammers (leaders)
announce their interference prices and then the legitimate
transmitter (follower) determines the interference requirements
according to the interference prices.
The interference received at the lth eavesdropper from the
corresponding private jammer can be written as follows:
Il = pl|gjl|
2
. (2)
Here, we are only interested in the transmit power used by the
jammer, where the beamformer at the jammer is appropriately
designed to ensure that there is no interference leakage to the
legitimate users. The private jammers aim to maximize their
revenues by selling interference to the transmitter. The revenue
of the lth private jammer can be written as follows:
φl(µl) = µlpl|gjl|
2
, (3)
where µl is the unit interference price charged by the cor-
responding jammer to cause interference at the lth eaves-
dropper. Depending on the interference requirement at the
lth eavesdropper, the interference price should be determined
by the corresponding jammer to maximize its revenue. These
interference prices can be determined by solving the following
optimization problem:
Problem (A): max
µ0
L∑
l=1
φl(µl, pl), (4)
where µ = [µ1 · · ·µL] includes the interference prices.
On the other hand, the transmitter aims to maximize its rev-
enue by charging the legitimate users based on their achievable
secrecy rates, where the revenue function at the transmitter can
be written as follows:
ψL(p,µ) =
K∑
k=1
λkRk −
L∑
l=1
µlpl|gjl|
2
, (5)
where λk and Rk are the unit price for the secrecy rate and
the achievable secrecy rate at the kth user, respectively. It
is assumed that the unit price for each user is fixed at a
predetermined value. Hence, the transmitter should determine
the beamforming vector as well as the interference require-
ments at different eavesdroppers in order to maximize its
revenue. We first focus on the interference requirements at
each eavesdropper with a fixed beamformer at the transmitter,
which can be formulated into an optimization problem as
follows:
Problem (B): max
p0
ψL(p,µ), (6)
where p = [p1 · · · pL] represents the power allocation coef-
ficients at all jammers. Problem (A) and Problem (B) form
a Stackelberg game, and it is important to investigate the
corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium.
A. Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game is
defined as follows:
Stackelberg equilibrium: Let p∗ be the optimal solution for
Problem (B) whereas µ∗ contains the best prices for Problem
(A). The solutions p∗ and µ∗ define the Stackelberg equilib-
rium point if the following conditions are satisfied for any set
of p and µ:
ψL(p
∗
,µ
∗)≥ψL(p,µ
∗), φl(p
∗
l , µ
∗
l )≥φl(p
∗
l , µl), ∀ l.
IV. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
In this section, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium
solution for the proposed game. In order to analyze this
equilibrium, the best response of the transmitter is first derived
in terms of the interference requirement at each eavesdropper
for fixed interference prices. Then, the optimal interference
prices for the private jammers are obtained to maximize their
revenues. These best responses can be derived by solving
Problem (A) and Problem (B). Particularly, we first solve the
problem for a scenario with fixed interference prices. Based on
this solution, we then derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for
the proposed game. Note that we only consider the secure
communication network with a single legitimate user and
multiple eavesdroppers. However, this can be easily extended
for a scenario with multiple legitimate users and multiple
eavesdroppers.
A. Fixed Interference Prices
In this subsection, we focus on the fixed interference price
scenario with a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdrop-
pers. Note that for a particular user, eavesdroppers with large
achievable rates are more damaging since they significantly
reduce the secrecy rate of this legitimate user. Therefore,
introducing jamming to these eavesdroppers will effectively
improve the achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate user.
Therefore, a set of eavesdroppers which have strong connec-
tions to the source are defined as super-active eavesdroppers.
The rest of the eavesdroppers are referred as non-super-active
eavesdroppers. The achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate
user is defined as follows:
R1 = log(1 + β0)− max
1≤i≤L
log
(
1 +
βi
σ2e + piαi
)
, (7)
where
β0 =
wHh1h
H
1 w
σ2
, βi = w
H
gig
H
i w, αi = |gji|
2
. (8)
The optimal interference requirements at each eavesdropper
can be formulated as follows:
max
p0
λ1R1 −
∑
i∈K
µipiαi, (9)
where vector p = [p1 · · · pK ] includes the power allocation
coefficients of the private jammers in the set K consisting of
all super-active eavesdroppers. Without loss of generality, this
problem can be reformulated as follows:
max
p0, ti, t0
λ1 [log(1 + β0)− t0]−
K∑
i=1
µipiαi
s.t. log
(
1 +
βi
σ2e + piαi
)
≤ ti, ∀ k
max{t1, · · · , tK} = t0, ∀ k, ti ≥ 0, ∀ k.(10)
This problem is convex with respect to the power allocation
coefficients at the private jammers and can be efficiently
solved through interior point methods [23].
Proposition 1: By using the optimal solution of (10),
the achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e.,
ti, i ∈ K) will be equal and the power allocation coefficients
of the non-super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i /∈ K) will be all
zeros.
Proof : Assume that ti, i ∈ K are not equal. Assume
that the minimum ti = tmin < t0 from all ti, i = 1, · · · ,K ,
and the corresponding pi will be higher than that of
tmin = t0. Hence, the revenue of the transmitter (cost
function of (10)) with ti = tmin will be less than that
with ti = t0. Thus, the achievable rates of the super-active
eavesdroppers (i.e., ti, i ∈ K) will be equal when the optimal
solution is used and the power allocation coefficients for
the non-super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i /∈ K) will be zero.
Hence, the optimal interference requirements can be
obtained by solving the convex problem in (10).
B. Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we formulate the problem into a Stackel-
berg game and investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium for the
proposed game. In order to derive the equilibrium of the game,
the best responses of both the leaders and the follower should
be obtained. The best response of the legitimate transmitter
can be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
p0
λ1RSL−ME −
∑
i∈K
µipiαi, (11)
where the vector p = [p1 · · · pK ] consists of the power
allocation coefficients of the private jammers in the super-
active eavesdropper set K. As we discussed in the previous
subsection in (10), this problem is convex and the optimal
power allocation can be obtained. Furthermore, the closed-
form solution of this power allocation problem should be
determined by deriving the Stackelberg equilibrium of the
proposed game, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal power allocation coefficient at
the ith jammer is given by
p
∗
i =
1
αi
[
βi
γ0
− σ2e
]+
, (12)
where
βi = w
Hgig
H
i w
γ∗0 =
∑K
i=1 µiβi+
√∑K
i=1µiβi
(
4λ1+
∑K
i=1 µiβi
)
2λ1
(13)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
The private jammers need to announce their interference
prices to maximize their revenues. These optimal interference
prices can be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
µ0
L∑
l=1
φi(p
∗
i , µi) =
L∑
l=1
µip
∗
iαi. (14)
Based on the closed-form solution of the optimal power
allocation coefficients p∗i s in (12) in terms of the interference
prices µis, the optimal interference prices problem can be
reformulated as
max
µ0
2λ1
∑K
i=1 µiβi∑K
i=1 µiβi+
√∑K
i=1µiβi
(
4λ1+
∑K
i=1 µiβi
) − σ2e
K∑
i=1
µi.
(15)
The optimal interference prices µis can be obtained by solving
the above problem through existing numerical methods. How-
ever, the closed-form solutions of these interference prices are
not easy to derive. Therefore, we assume the use of the same
interference price (uniform interference price) for all private
jammers (i.e., µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µK = µ0). The problem in
(15) can be formulated with the uniform interference price as
follows:
max
µ0≥0
2λ1µ0
∑K
i=1 βi
µ0
∑K
i=1 βi+
√
µ0
∑K
i=1βi
(
4λ1+ µ0
∑K
i=1 βi
) −Kσ2eµ0.
(16)
Lemma 2: The optimal interference price µ∗0 in (16) is given
by
µ
∗
0 =
0.5
[
−4λ1Kσ
2η1 + 2λ1
√
Kσ2η2 + 4K2σ4η21
]
Kσ2η2
(17)
where
η1 =
(
1 +
Kσ2
c¯2
)
, η2 =
(
c¯2 +Kσ
2)
, c¯2 =
K∑
i=1
βi. (18)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. 
Hence, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game with
uniform interference price can be defined by (p∗i ∀ i, µ∗0), at
which both the transmitter and the private jammers maximize
their revenues.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we validate the derived theoretical results by
using computer simulations. Here, we consider a multicasting
network with a single legitimate user and two eavesdroppers,
where the transmitter broadcasts the same information to all
the legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
In addition, private jammers are employed to confuse the
eavesdroppers by introducing interference, which will improve
the achievable secrecy rates of the legitimate users. It is
assumed that the legitimate transmitter is equipped with three
antennas whereas the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers
have a single antenna. The channel coefficients between all the
terminals are generated through zero-mean circularly symmet-
ric independent and identically distributed complex Gaussian
random variables and the noise variance at all the terminals is
assumed to be 0.1. In the following subsections, we provide
simulation results for the scenario with the fixed interference
prices and the Stackelberg game scenario, respectively.
A. Fixed Interference Prices
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the
proposed schemes with fixed interference prices at the private
jammers. The fixed unit interference prices at the jammers are
assumed to be 1 and 3 (i.e., µ1 = 1, µ2 = 3), respectively.
Table 1 provides the theoretical and simulation based optimal
power allocation coefficients and the corresponding revenues
of the legitimate transmitter for different sets of channels.
These results validate the derivation of the theoretical results
which are indistinguishable with the simulation based results.
B. Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we validate the derived Stackelberg
equilibrium of the proposed game. Table 2 provides the derived
theoretical Stackelberg equilibrium and the simulation based
one, as well as the corresponding jammer revenues with the
uniform interference price assumption (i.e., µ1 = µ2 = µ0) for
different sets of channels. The simulation results are consistent
to the theoretical ones and validate the Stackelberg equilibrium
of the proposed game for different sets of channels. It is worth
pointing out that any deviations from these equilibria caused
by different strategies of the legitimate transmitter and the
jammers will introduce loss in their revenues.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the secrecy rate optimization
problem for a multicasting network, where multiple users are
to receive the same information in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers. To improve the secrecy rate performance, pri-
vate jammers were employed to generate interference to the
eavesdroppers. In addition, these jammers charge the legiti-
mate transceivers for their jamming services. This optimization
Channels Power Allocation:Jammer 1
Power Allocation:
Jammer 2
Achieved
Secrecy Rate
Revenue:
Legitimate Transmitter
Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation
Channel 1 0.3324 0.3324 0.7457 0.7458 2.7083 2.7241 13.0855 12.8145
Channel 2 0.1264 0.1264 0.5729 0.5430 3.3334 3.3223 15.2002 15.2016
Channel 3 3.3886 3.3889 1.0284 1.0284 2.8085 2.8234 13.4161 13.4203
Channel 4 1.1613 1.1614 1.0441 1.0442 2.9185 2.9296 13.7907 13.7928
Channel 5 0.2778 0.2778 2.0209 2.0211 3.2938 3.2949 15.1031 15.1031
TABLE 1: The optimal power allocation of the private jammers with fixed interference prices µ1 = 1 and µ2 = 3, achievable
secrecy rates and revenues of legitimate transmitter obtained from closed-form solution and simulation for different sets of
channels. The unit price for the achievable secrecy rate at the legitimate user is 5 (λ1 = 5).
Channels Interference Price: Revenue of Jammers: Stackelberg Equilibrium:
(p∗1, p
∗
2, µ
∗
0)
Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation
Channel 1 4.0721 4.1000 1.5381 1.5378 (0.0677, 0.3070, 4.0721)
Channel 2 2.1647 2.2000 0.5372 0.5378 (0.3076, 0.6900, 2.1647)
Channel 3 2.6639 2.7000 0.7088 0.7084 (0.1501, 1.0917, 2.6639)
Channel 4 3.1023 3.1000 0.8887 0.8892 (0.1501, 0.6996, 3.1023)
Channel 5 4.0322 4.0000 1.4932 1.4935 (2.5895, 0.7858, 4.0322)
TABLE 2: The optimal interference prices and revenues of the private jammers as well as Stackelberg equilibrium for
different sets of channels. The unit price for the achievable secrecy rate at the legitimate user is 5 (λ1 = 5).
∂f(µ0)
∂µ0
=
2λ1c¯1
µ0c¯1 + q
−
2λ1c¯1µ0
(
c¯1 +
c¯2
1
µ0+2λ1c¯1
µ0 c¯1+q
)
(µ0c¯1 + q)
2 , where q =
√
µ0c¯1(4λ1 + µ0c¯1), c¯1 =
K∑
i=1
βi
∂2f(µ0)
∂µ20
=
−4λ1c¯1
(
c¯1 +
c¯2
1
µ0+2λ1c¯1
q
)
(c¯1µ0 + q)
2
+
4λ1c¯1µ0
(
c¯1 +
c¯2
1
µ0+2λ1c¯1
q
)2
(c¯1µ0 + q)
3
−
2λ1c¯1µ0
(
c¯2
1
q
− (c¯1µ0+2λ1c¯1)
2
q3
)
(c¯1µ0 + q)
2
(19)
∂2f(µ0)
∂µ20
=
−4λ1c¯
2
1q(q + c¯1µ0 + 2λ1)[q
2 − c¯1µ0(c¯1µ0 + λ1)]− 2λ1c¯
3
1µ0 (c¯1µ0 + q)
[
q2 − (c¯1µ0 + 2λ1)
2
]
q3 (c¯1µ0 + q)
3
(20)
By substituting q =
√
µ0c¯1(4λ1 + µ0c¯1),=⇒
∂2f(µ0)
∂µ20
=
−12λ21c¯
3
1qµ0 (q + c¯1µ0 + 2λ1)− 8λ
3
1c¯
3
1µ0 (c¯1µ0 + q)
q3 (c¯1µ0 + q)
3
< 0 (21)
problem was formulated into a Stackelberg game, where the
private jammers and the legitimate transmitter are the players
of the game. We first focused on the fixed interference price
scenario and a closed-form solution was derived for the
optimal interference requirements. Based on this solution, a
Stackelberg equilibrium was derived to maximize the revenues
of both the legitimate transmitter and the private jammers.
Simulation results were provided to support the derived theo-
retical results.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
With the optimal power allocation coefficients in (10), the
achievable rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i ∈ K)
will be equal as stated in Proposition 1. Hence, the power
allocation coefficient at the ith private jammer can be written
as follows:
βi
σ2e + piαi
= γ0,=⇒ pi =
1
αi
[
βi
γ0
− σ2e
]+
. (22)
The original optimization problem in (10) can be formulated
in terms of γ0 as follows:
max
γ0≥0
λ1 [log(1 + β0)−log(1+γ0)]−
1
γ0
K∑
i=1
µiβi+σ
2
e
K∑
i=1
µi
, f(γ0) (23)
The optimal γ∗0 should satisfy the KKT conditions and there-
fore we obtain the following:
∂f(γ0)
∂γ0
=−
λ1
1+γ0
+
τ
γ20
,
∂2f(γ0)
∂γ20
=
λ1
(1+γ0)2
−
2τ
γ30
, (24)
where τ =
∑K
i=1µiβi. The function f(γ0) is concave if the
following condition is satisfied:
γ30
(1 + γ0)2
≤
2τ
λ1
. (25)
Hence, the optimal γ∗0 can be obtained if λ1 is large enough
to satisfy the above condition. This means that the legitimate
transmitter should charge the legitimate user a reasonable price
to make a profit. Note that the optimal γ∗0 should satisfy the
KKT conditions.
∂f(γ0)
∂γ0
= 0. (26)
The optimal γ∗0 can be obtained by solving the following
equation:
λ1γ
2
0 − γ0
K∑
i=1
µiβi−
K∑
i=1
µiβi = 0. (27)
and γ0 > 0,
γ
∗
0 =
∑K
i=1 µiβi +
√∑K
i=1 µiβi
(
4λ0+
∑K
i=1 µiβi
)
2λ1
. (28)
Hence the optimal power allocation coefficient of the ith can
be written as follows:
p
∗
i =
1
αi
[
βi
γ∗0
− σ2e
]+
. (29)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first show that the revenue function of the jammers in
(16) is concave in terms of µ0 for pi > (0) in (12), and then we
derive the optimal interference price µ∗0. The revenue function
of the jammers is defined as follows:
f(µ0) =
2λ1µ0c¯1
µ0c¯1+
√
µ0c¯1 (4λ1+ µ0¯c1)
−Kσ2eµ0, (30)
where c¯1 =
∑K
i=1 βi. The concavity of f(µ0) can be proven
by finding the second derivative with respect to µ0 as in (19).
In order to prove that the function in (30) is concave, we need
to show that the second derivative (i.e.,∂2f(µ0)
∂µ2
0
) is negative.
This has been proved in (20) and (21) which are in the previous
page. This confirms that the revenue function of the jammers
is concave in µ0 and the optimal µ∗0 should satisfy the KKT
conditions ∂f(µ0)
∂µ0
= 0 [23]:
2λ1c¯1
µ0c¯1 + q
−
2λ1c¯1µ0
(
c¯1 +
c¯2
1
µ0+2λ1 c¯1
µ0 c¯1+q
)
(µ0c¯1 + q)
2 = 0, (31)
µ
∗
0 =
0.5
[
−4λ1Kσ
2η1 + 2λ1
√
Kσ2η2 + 4K2σ4η21
]
Kσ2η2
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
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